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LUNCHEON ADDRESS
ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM:
IS THE DEFENSE BAR A PROBLEM?
THE HONORABLE RALPH WINTER*

It is always a pleasure to be asked to speak to The Federalist Society.
Some of the older members say I am a broken record, but I can remember
a day when the entire membership of The Federalist Society was in my
office at Yale Law School and there were chairs left vacant. My speech
is based on a conversation that I had with Leonard Leo1 that he later
titled, I believe, Meaningful Change in Our Civil Justice System: Is the
Defense Bar a Problem? Not having seen the title, it turns out that I
nevertheless began the conversation with the line, "Meaningful change in
our civil justice system will not be easily accomplished." One reason for
this has to do with the incentives of the bar and the shaping of that
system. Those desiring reform tend to view the plaintiffs' bar, and the
control of bar associations by ideologue, as the principal source of
opposition to reform.
Several years ago, Judge Silberman wrote an article entitled Will
Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?2 The article pointed out that
it is the entire profession, and not a parochial segment, that has an
economic interest in the proliferation of legal rules and complex legal
proceedings.' The jury is still out on whether democratic capitalism will
die gasping for air under the weight of litigation. However, time may be
proving Judge Silberman right on the mark, that is, in perceiving lawyers
as a group that presses its self-interest in shaping our legal system.
I was struck last night by John Stossel referring to the lawyering
industry as part of the economic "market."' I think that is not entirely
wrong, but mostly wrong. The demand for lawyers is not governed by a
market where consumers may exercise free choice as to whether to use
lawyers at all. Rather, the demand for lawyers is the result of
government, and lawyers have every reason to understand this condition.
We are a nation where lawyers play a major role in government, and the
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Chair
of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence.
1. Director, National Lawyers Division, The Federalist Society for Law & Public

Policy Studies.
2. Laurence H. Silberman, Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?,
REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 15.

3. See id. at 19-22, 44.
4. See John Stossel, DinnerAddress, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517 (1997).
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result is there for all to see. Some legal rules seem to exist solely because
lawyers profit from them. Civil RICO5 provides treble damages and
attorneys' fees in cases that never involve actual racketeering or organized
crime,' with predicate acts alleged under the broad definition of mail
fraud being developed into criminal law, 7 and where enforcement is
limited by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion of the resources
available. 8
Civil RICO is now routinely a source of federal jurisdiction in what
would otherwise be routine state law claims. Any dispute over a contract
that requires periodic performance or communication between the parties
can support allegations of a pattern of racketeering activity involving
misleading statements or failures to inform. In fact, the first civil RICO
case to reach the United States Supreme Court was a garden variety
breach of contract action. 9 One result of civil RICO, therefore, is that its
treble damages and attorneys' fees provisions have partially displaced
ancient common law rules concerning damages for breach of contract.
This is truly a bizarre result and suggests that, in enacting RICO,
Congress believed that Hadley v. Baxendale0 was the work of La Cosa
Nostra.
It is instructive that only a powerful group like the securities industry
has gotten political relief, even though it may turn out to be only partial
5. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. 11996).

6. See id. § 1964(c); see also Roger T. Creager, A CurrentGuide to Civil RICO in
New York FederalCourts, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 18 (1994) (stating that treble damages and
attorneys' fees are awarded in cases dealing with ordinary business).
7. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (holding that
Sedima, a corporation that entered into a contract with Imrex, could maintain a cause of
action for civil RICO based on claims of mail and wire fraud, where Sedima believed
that Imrex was cheating Sedima out of a portion of its proceeds from the contract by
collecting for nonexistent expenses).
8. See generally David M. Ludwick, Restricting RICO: Narrowing the Scope of
Enterprise, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 381, 415-16 (1993) (explaining that
prosecutorial discretion is a valuable check on the broad application of RICO due to
limited government resources).
9. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 (permitting RICO to reach garden variety fraud and
breach of contract cases by stating "[i]f the defendant engages in a pattern of
racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by these provisions, and the racketeering
activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim").
10. 156 Eng. Rep. 341 (1854) (holding that in a breach of contract case, damages
should be such that were reasonably in the contemplation of both parties when the
contract was made).
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relief from civil RICO." Otherwise, civil RICO is alive and well and
threatening the less powerful, such as ordinary individual proprietors or
the construction business, and, at the same time, profiting lawyers.
Additionally, there is considerable evidence that derivative and class
actions in the corporate area profit lawyers while imposing a net loss on
investors-the very class they are supposed to protect. 2 Even the most
favorable studies suggest that in a large number of such cases investors
receive no benefit, even though paying the legal fees of all the parties.' 3
In other cases, wealth is transferred from one group of investors to
another, with the first group of investors paying all legal fees. Or, some
investors may benefit, but the benefit comes from insurance that most
sizeable corporations purchase.' 4 In these cases, the insurance pays all
legal fees, but the cost of the insurance is ultimately borne by the
investors, so, overall, the investors have a net loss.15
Even in the small number of cases in which there is a net return to
investors, the settlement may often be, at best, only roughly related to the
merits of the underlying claims, resulting in the over-compensation of
weak claims and the under-compensation of strong claims. 6 The only
constant is the benefit reaped by both the plaintiffs' and defendants'
lawyers. Therefore, it is a misperception to single out plaintiffs' lawyers,
or lawyers with particular ideological beliefs, as having the sole incentives
11. See generally Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class
Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUs. LAW. 1009 (1996). The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 "amend[ed] RICO to eliminate securities fraud
as a predicate act of racketeering under civil RICO." Id. at 1061 (citing 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 1 1996)).
12. See id. at 1029-39 (discussing how the use of security class action suits may be
abused by lawyers).
13. See id. at 1030 (commenting that in securities litigation the expenses of lawsuits
are most often borne by the shareholders).
14. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 550 (1991) (explaining that insurance,
most often in the form of directors' and officers' liability insurance, is a significant
source of funds in most securities class actions and is present in approximately 80% of
shareholder litigation).
15. See Roberta Romano, The ShareholderSuit: Litigation Without Foundation?7
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991) (explaining that if a corporation's directors' and

officers' liability insurance reimburses the costs of a securities claim, this may result in
increased insurance premiums which is a cost ultimately borne by all of the
shareholders).
16. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 577 (arguing that in a non-merit based system,

investors with strong cases are under-rewarded while those with weak cases are overrewarded).
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to provide political support for unnecessary and inefficient rules of law
that increase the cost of litigation. This is a somewhat unusual
misperception because it comes from sources that understand economic
incentives in the political and economic marketplace, and that expect that
an industry will act politically to maximize returns to that industry.
The fact is that the economic incentives of defense lawyers regarding
rules that proliferate litigation do not significantly differ from those of
plaintiffs' lawyers. Lawyers, as a group, including the defense bar, have
an interest in maximizing the demand for legal services. This is
particularly the case at a time when practitioners must deal with the high
cost of support services, the instability of law firms, and the
understandably increasing restlessness of clients. It is because the demand
for legal services is affected by the nature of substantive and procedural
rules that reform in those rules, which may reduce the cost of litigation,
will often be met by powerful opposition from the lawyering industry,
including lawyers whose clients might actually be aided by the reforms.
Members of the defense bar may not always be vocal in opposing
reform, but they are not likely to zealously support reform that may result
in a reduced demand for their services.
Indeed, the defense bar
sometimes openly opposes measures that seek promising methods of
reducing litigation costs to their clients. For example, a couple of years
ago, a proposal was made to limit contingency fees in personal injury
cases to that portion of a settlement or judgment to which the plaintiff's
lawyer had added value.17 Under this proposal, if the defendant accepted
the plaintiff's early demand for settlement, fees of the plaintiffs counsel
would be capped at ten percent of the first one hundred thousand dollars
and five percent of any greater amounts.' If rejected, contingency fees
could later be charged only against net recoveries in excess of the
offer.1 Moreover, the plaintiff's demand for settlement would have to
be accompanied by basic, routinely discoverable information to allow the
defendant to evaluate the claim.'
I am unsure of this proposal's validity. It was stridently attacked by
some members of the defense bar," although I see nothing in it that
would compel their clients to make an offer of settlement or otherwise
weaken their case. It is difficult to see how any of the defense bar's
17. See generally Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A
Proposalfor Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173 (1995) (discussing the
contingency fee reform proposal and the criticism it received from the defense bar).

18. See id. at 175.
19. See id. at 176.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 183-92 (criticizing the defense bar, including Stephen J. Paris, a
leading spokesperson for the defense bar, for opposing the proposal).
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clients could have been adversely affected by this proposal. The
opposition from this quarter also seems peculiar because the defense bar
does not generally oppose caps on contingency fees. While some of those
who made this proposal have stated it openly, I only speculate that what
actually troubled the critics was that the proposal would have given
plaintiffs and defendants a great incentive to reach an early settlement
without incurring substantial legal bills .
Similarly, the defense bar abstractly supports the need to find ways to
reduce the large resources that go into civil discovery, but mounts
ferocious and often unprincipled opposition to concrete measures that will
actually reduce that cost. I will speak at length on this because I was a
member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules when that Committee
took up complaints about excessive discovery, which I perceived as
coming from defendants and their lawyers.
To briefly summarize the situation, over the course of several years,
the Committee discussed the problem and, in its judgment, decided that
one partial remedy would be to require automatic disclosure, without a
request by the other party, of core information that any competent lawyer
would otherwise have requested and that any competent judge would have
ordered disclosed. In requiring the automatic provision of such materials,
the Committee thought that the costs of formal requests and often frivolous
opposition would be eliminated and cases could progress quickly. The
Committee proposed an amendment to Rule 26 that required the disclosure
of the names of witnesses and locations,' and categories of documents
"likely to bear significantly on any claim or defense."24 I favored the
general venture of looking for ways to reduce discovery costs. However,
I had great doubts about this particular proposal and, indeed, voted against
it. I believe I was the only member of the Committee to vote against it
at this early stage, because I thought it was entirely too ambiguous.
When the proposal went out for comment, criticism quickly appeared
in great quantity. There was an organized campaign that sent the
22. See id. at 184 (stating that the proposal was "attacked by members of the
defense bar, in part because its early settlement mechanisms would radically reduce the

cost of defense counsel").
23. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 14-15 (Aug. 1991)
[hereinafer 1991 PROPOSAL] (proposing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)). For a discussion
of the proposed Rule 26, see id. advisory committee's note, at 26. Also, for a discussion
of the history of the amendments to Rule 26(a), see generally Charles W. Sorenson, Jr.,

Disclosure Under FederalRule of Civil Procedure26(a)-"Much Ado About Nothing?,"

46 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (1995).
24. 1991 PROPOSAL, supra note 23, at 15 (proposing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B)).
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Committee a barrage of letters and presented oral testimony from lawyers
throughout the country. Although the lawyers were widely dispersed
geographically, many of the letters used virtually identical language. I see
nothing wrong with this method of lobbying, so long as the person signing
the letter verifies the merits of the criticism that has been provided for
retransmission. Disturbingly, much of the correspondence had not done
that. We received a large number of letters and heard oral testimony that
asserted the entirely false claim that privileged and work product materials
would have to be automatically disclosed under the proposed rule. Yet the
proposal specifically allowed parties to assert and get a ruling on any work
product or privilege claim before materials subject to such a claim needed
to be disclosed.'
However, I thought the criticism was, for the most part, well taken.
As drafted, the proposal seemed to require disclosure of all materials
relevant to any legal theory the answer or complaint might support. If a
party failed to anticipate the legal theory of its adversary, the disclosure
might be deemed inadequate and violate Rule 26. Moreover, as proposed,
the Rule would cause a party to alert the adversary to legal theories of
which it was ignorant. All this is quite beyond the other problems
associated with the expectation that discovery might be massive for little
purpose.
After receiving the commentary, the committee revised the proposal
to only require automatic disclosure of materials that were "relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings." 26 This
language was taken from Rule 9(b) 2 and had a body of case law
2
interpreting it.
Under the revised rule, a general allegation that a
product injured a person through a design defect would not trigger any
disclosure, because it does not involve facts alleged with particularity but,
instead, facts that are only conclusory.2 9 On the other hand, an
allegation that a railroad crossing at a particular location was unattended,
and that a plaintiffs car was struck by a particular Amtrak locomotive on
a certain day, at 2:15 p.m., would trigger disclosure. There is an
inevitable area of ambiguity, but it is no more than the irreducible
25. See id. at 21 (proposing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
28. See, e.g., Buckley v. Altheimer, 2 F.R.D. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1942); United States
v. Dittrich, 3 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Ky. 1943); Sorenson, Jr., supra note 23, at 732-43
(comparing the language of Rule 26(a) with the text of other rules, including Rule 9(b)).
See generally 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2053 (2d ed. 1994) (supporting the proposition that Rule 26 borrowed language from
Rule 9(b)).

29. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note.
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ambiguity that exists with any rule. Furthermore, there will be judges
who will make decisions that do not seem right, as is often the case with
other rules. I suggest that the present rules, when interpreted by those
same judges, would lead to exactly the same result, but only after a great
deal of papers have been filed. The Committee regarded it in good faith
as having responded to the criticism. Under the Rule, no one had to
disclose anything, and no one had to concern themselves with what the
adversary's legal theories were. If there was a fact that was alleged with
which you disagreed, you could move under Rule 12(f) to strike it as
irrelevant.3" I, as well as others, thought that the revised proposal met
most of the legitimate criticism; nevertheless, the outrage of the bar
continued.
One charge that I really do not understand-and, therefore, will make
some light of-is that the rule would interfere with the relationship
between attorneys and their clients. This idea is based on the premise that
a legal obligation to disclose unhelpful, not to say negative, materials
should not be imposed because lawyers do not want to have to tell their
clients that they have an obligation to disclose. That is a very peculiar
view of the lawyer's role. It seems to posit that a would-be lawyer for
Willy Sutton should not have to tell him that he had an obligation not to
rob banks, because that would interfere with their attorney-client
relationship. However, once the bank was robbed and Willy Sutton was
convicted, then it was acceptable. This argument also reflected the
troubling notion that the attorney-client relationship is enhanced by
charging substantial sums to a client for the fruitless defense of a
discovery motion, resulting in an inevitable order of disclosure. Indeed,
it seemed to me the very argument that costless, but useless, proceedings
are desirable is, in itself, an admission that wasteful civil discovery
routinely occurs, largely for the benefit of lawyers.
Finally, it was charged that automatic disclosure was inconsistent with
the adversary system. However, most discovery in the criminal law area
is in the nature of automatic disclosure; in particular, the obligation of the
government to disclose exculpatory material to the defendant.31
Just recently, the Judicial Conference of the United States killed a
proposal that would have introduced more limited formal discovery in
criminal law similar to civil discovery. It would not be nearly as
extensive as civil discovery, but it would still be formal discovery. To my
knowledge, no one argued to the Conference that we have to have formal
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f) ("Upon motion made by a party... the court may order
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial [or]

impertinent... matter.").
31. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the suppression
of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution upon request violates due process).
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discovery in order to make criminal proceedings adversarial. Although I

disagree with the concept that automatic disclosure was inconsistent with

the adversary system, numerous people, including Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Souter agreed with it to one. degree or another.3 2
Several of the critics simply ignored the new language requiring
disclosure only of materials relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity and continued to attack the original proposal, even though it
had been redrafted.33 For example, at a symposium on procedure, I
encountered an executive of a drug company who was organizing
opposition to the Rule, but who had not been informed that the Rule had
been rewritten. Moreover, some of the articles and critics continued to
assert that the Rule purported to eliminate the attorney-client privilege and

work product immunity.'
The most troubling thing, however, was what did not appear. What
did not appear was any rebuttal to the argument that costly proceedings
should not attend disclosure of materials that any competent lawyer will
ask for and any competent judge will grant. No constructive alternatives
that would reduce the costs of civil discovery were offered, nor was the
status quo defended. Any possibilities for change were simply denounced.
In watching this entirely misleading debate unfold, I became
convinced that the defense bar's failure to address the merits was, in part,
32. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 507,511
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Souter and Thomas) (stating that the
changes to Rule 26(a) "[do] not fit comfortably within the American judicial system,
which relies on adversarial litigation" and "place intolerable stress upon lawyers' ethical
duty to represent their clients and not to assist the opposing side").
33. See Randall Samborn, Rules for Discovery Uncertain: Opposition Lingers to
Mandatory Disclosure, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 1 (discussing the opposition and
criticism the proposed amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
received since first proposed in 1991 and failing to recognize that the proposal was
redrafted since it was first proposed); see also ABA Denounces New Discovery Rule,
Accredits Lawyer Specialization Agencies, 62 U.S.L.W. 2095 (1993) (criticizing the
Rule's wording as likely to result in more litigation, without addressing the fact that the
language in dispute was in fact added to reduce the Rule's ambiguity). But see Griffin
B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. RaV.
1, 39 (1992) (characterizing the proposal to Rule 26(a)(1) as being fundamentally flawed
because the new language "relevant to disputed facts" is overly broad and vague).
34. See, e.g., Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be
Litigators, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15; Leslie M. Kelleher, The December 1993
Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure-A CriticalAnalysis, 12 TouRo L.
REv. 7, 103-04 (1995). But see Sorenson, Jr., supra note 23, at 761 (stating that such
arguments -represent a visceral response based on some general, vague notion of the way
the system is supposed to work, rather than a carefully reasoned or substantiated analysis
based on actual doctrines").

19971

LUNCHEON ADDRESS

a strategy to mislead its clients, as well as to persuade Congress to reject
the Rule. For all of the protests by the defense bar, the plaintiffs' bar also
was not enthusiastic about the proposal.3 5
In conversation with plaintiffs' lawyers, and from some remarks
quoted in the press, I gather that many in the plaintiffs' bar did not share
the view that the amendments to Rule 26 disadvantaged defendants. They
viewed automatic disclosure as a device that might expose weaknesses in
their case before they had an opportunity for discovery. I am in no
position to judge whether they were right or wrong, but the widely held
view that defendants will be terribly disadvantaged was simply not shared
by all the plaintiffs' groups.
I want to emphasize that I do not mean to say that automatic
disclosure, or the Rule, is a panacea, or that it may not be misused or
cannot be improved upon. I am also not saying that there are not
legitimate arguments against it. I am not saying any of those things.
Indeed, I once described the Rule in print as barely non-trivial, because
any wrongs it causes will all occur anyway under the present Rule, but at
greater expense to the clients. In my opinion, on the merits, it simply did
not justify all of the resistance and controversy generated.
I will say that experience with automatic disclosure, as I understand
it, can be described as positive. There are other jurisdictions that do not
use it. There are also some jurisdictions where it is in the Rules, but the
lawyers do not use it, either because they are ignorant of it, they do not
like it on principle, or they would rather bill their clients. I understand
that a preliminary draft of a survey under the Biden bill36 indicates that
where automatic disclosure has been used, there has not been a feared
increase in satellite litigation.
Nevertheless, I think further discovery reform may well be dead. I
originally thought that automatic disclosure might come as a first step
followed by a rule that said that all further discovery would be by leave
of court, thereby preventing these enormous fishing expeditions.
However, I think further discovery reform is a corpse with a contagious
disease; as for who killed it, I do not know. If the lawyers killed it, it
was the perfect crime because they left their clients' fingerprints on the
body.
35. See Samborn, supra note 33, at 26 (discussing how plaintiffs' and civil rights
lawyers argue the proposed amendment to Rule 26 would give an unfair advantage to
defendants, and the defense bar contends that the amendment impinges on the attorneyclient privilege); Sorenson, Jr., supra note 23, at 731 (explaining that opposition to the
new disclosure rule was widespread across the defense bar, the plaintiffs' bar and
academia).
36. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1995).
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I have described this controversy, first, because I was familiar with
it, and, second, because I am the most skeptical person involved in this
whole venture; but I also think it illustrates the enormous political
difficulties inherent in any reform that lessens the cost of litigation. Many
of the areas where reform has been suggested, such as discovery, are
really central to the profit centers that are at the heart of the staffing and
organization of law firms. With many mouths to feed, those who run
firms necessarily view these proposals with great disquiet because they
might disrupt their business, their way of life, and their standard of living.
Not only are these firms powerful institutions, but they are run by persons
of influence, great ability, and great learning. They are also the principal
source of information to clients as to how reforms will affect them. It is
to be expected that any proposal that reduces the cost of litigation to
clients will be portrayed by some as disadvantaging the clients in litigation
and increasing the amounts, judgments, and settlements to be paid. As for
some types of changes, that portrayal may well be entirely accurate.
However, at least in my view, the history of Rule 26 suggests that
often it will not. So the principal organized constituency for reform is
partially disabled by having access only to flawed information, while the
ultimate beneficiary, the public, is diffuse and disinterested. Reformers
face a long lonely road in even getting the attention of those whose selfinterest lies in reform.

